



Türkiye at a Crossroads: The Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy Changes

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Abstrak: *Artikel jurnal ini membahas tentang pengaruh besar usaha Turki untuk bergabung dengan Uni Eropa terhadap kebijakan luar negerinya. Turki merupakan negara yang penting secara geopolitik dan memiliki sejarah dari Kekaisaran Ottoman, yang memberikan keuntungan dalam memperluas pengaruhnya di wilayah sekitarnya. Daripada hanya berfokus pada Uni Eropa, Turki dengan cerdas memilih untuk memperluas pengaruhnya, yang menguntungkan kepentingan nasionalnya. Di bawah pimpinan Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan (AKP) yang dipimpin oleh Recep Tayyip Erdogan dan Ahmet Davutoglu, kebijakan luar negeri Turki dirancang dengan baik dengan penerapan kebijakan "strategic depth," juga dipadukan dengan prinsip "zero problems" dan "good neighbors." Perubahan strategi ini menyebabkan Turki beralih dari orientasi Barat ke fokus lebih pada hubungan baik dengan negara-negara Muslim di Timur Tengah. Tentu saja, perubahan ini berdampak pada hubungan Turki dengan negara-negara Barat. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan faktor-faktor yang mendorong perubahan kebijakan luar negeri Turki tersebut. Dengan memahami dinamika yang terlibat dan akibatnya bagi interaksi global Turki, artikel ini membantu memahami peran Turki dalam hubungan internasional dan memprediksi perkembangan diplomasi di masa depan.*

Kata Kunci: *Kebijakan Luar Negeri, AKP, Turki.*

Abstract: *This journal article delves into the profound impact of Turkey's protracted quest for European Union membership on its foreign policy direction. As a nation boasting strategic geopolitical significance and a historical legacy rooted in the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's unique positioning offers it a competitive advantage in extending its influence throughout the region. Rather than remaining confined to the EU's doorstep, Turkey has tactically chosen to widen its sphere of influence, reaping benefits for its national interests. Under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) spearheaded by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's foreign policy has been masterfully engineered with the implementation of the "strategic depth" policy, complemented by principles such as "zero problems" and "good neighbors." This strategic framework has witnessed Turkey's pivot from a Western-oriented approach towards the Middle East, particularly focusing on fostering relations with neighboring Muslim nations. Naturally, such a shift has not been without consequences for Turkey's relations with Western counterparts. This journal article aims to elucidate the underlying catalysts propelling Turkey's transformative foreign policy trajectory. By examining the dynamics at play and the subsequent implications for Turkey's global interactions, the study sheds light on the intricacies of this pivotal geopolitical shift. Understanding Turkey's evolving foreign policy stance is vital for comprehending its role in the international arena and anticipating future diplomatic developments.*

Keywords: *foreign policy, AKP, Türkiye*

INTRODUCTION

The political and social landscape in Türkiye underwent significant changes starting with its involvement in World War I, which resulted in the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, Türkiye embarked on a struggle under Mustafa Kemal's leadership for independence and the transformation into a modern nation-state, aligning itself with Western-style modernization. To support his efforts to "Westernize" Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal implemented quite extreme policies, including the establishment of a single political party in Türkiye, namely the People's Republican Party. He also formed a secret police unit tasked with arresting and, in some cases, eliminating political rivals perceived as threats to the ongoing revolution. The establishment of a single party is an effort to prevent

political competition from endangering Türkiye's national security, particularly concerning religious groups.

To achieve the objectives of the New Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal fostered a closer relationship with Western civilization through intensive cooperation, primarily in the domains of politics and economics, which proved beneficial for the nation. It was believed that Türkiye could attain peace and equality on the global stage by aligning with Western advancements, contrasting the traditional developments perceived as modern by the Ottoman Turks and the Arab world.

In its development, Kemalism is an ideological product preserved by the Turkish nation and has become an obligation of the Turkish military to take on the role of guardian of this ideology (Cizre 2008). The role of the Turkish military in Türkiye's political arena is considered central and unique. The Turkish military does not hesitate to overpower the state and take control from civil authorities if any deviation occurs from the Kemalist ideology. However, historically, the Turkish military has never held state power for long. As soon as they assume control, the reins of power promptly return to civilians through general elections arranged by the military. Consequently, it is not surprising that several coups by the military against the civilian government have occurred, all of which were based on Kemalist principles.

Türkiye's desire to gain recognition as a country on par with European countries has never gone away, by gained membership in various organizations initiated by the West or by both such as the formation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1973. Türkiye even applied to become part of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1964 under the cooperation agreement between the Republic of Türkiye and the European Economic Community in the Ankara Agreement. However, Türkiye's permanent membership has not been accepted, due to various reasons, including historical factors, democratization factors, and the Cyprus problem. Even so, Türkiye was accepted only as an associate, more than that, the purpose of Türkiye's membership in the EEC is to improve Türkiye's economy which in the late 1950s

experienced a financial crisis, as a result of falling Turkish exports and a lack of foreign investment coming into Türkiye (Aydin 2005), it is hoped that the opening up of the Turkish economy to foreign markets will increase Türkiye's income.

Türkiye's desire to be a full part of cooperation and organizations that are seen as having privileges in Europe was never completed until 2011. The support of Britain and the US for Türkiye's full membership in the European Union as a reference did not give side effects. The support provided by the two countries is nothing but based on their interests towards Türkiye, which is a major ally in NATO, however, the European Union member countries do not share the same view. Rejection of Türkiye's membership in the European Union, among others, came from Germany, France, Austria, Greece, and Greek Cyprus. There are variations in these denials, the most common being the historical background of Türkiye, which is a legacy of the Ottoman empire, although Mustafa Kemal has taken pains to remove the influence of Ottoman history from Türkiye not so for European countries. For France, Türkiye's membership in the European Union will only damage the order of political unity in the organization, as stated by Nicholaz Sarkkozy (turkishprass.com n.d.). Refusal of Türkiye's membership was not only made by France, Angela Merkel, who was Chancellor of Germany at the time, rejected Türkiye's membership in the European Union, due to the possibility of a threat in voting in the European Union Council based on the large population of member countries. As a middle way, Markel proposed that Türkiye become a "Privileged Partnership" with the European Union (Editorial Team 2010).

Under the NATO defense pact in the European region, Türkiye believes its proximity to Western powers will guarantee its security and independence (Goktepe n.d.). Türkiye provides infrastructure, communications networks, and intelligence information to its NATO allies and acts as a stronghold in southeastern Europe. Since the Cold War Türkiye has proven its loyalty to its allies in NATO, as stated by General Gürsel that Türkiye refused Soviet leader Nikita Khrushcev's request to become a neutral country between the Soviets and the Allies. Türkiye's loyalty was also shown during the First Gulf War, where Türkiye provided defense bases directly adjacent to Iraq to the US. However, this

long-standing good relationship was threatened by a statement made by Rick Perry, the presidential candidate of the US, who came from the republican party, stating that the US must redesign its relationship with its untrusted allies (Killough n.d.). As a result of this statement, the Turkish Foreign Ministry reacted strongly and called on the US to be more careful in selecting its leaders if it does not expect to lose a very valuable ally.

Türkiye's relationship with the US' strong ally, Israel, has also begun to falter. The attack by Israeli troops on the ship carrying humanitarian activists for Palestine, the Mavi Marmara, which was part of the convoy of ships "Gaza Freedom Flotilla", left eight Turkish citizens and one American citizen of Turkish descent dead, and 70 other people of various nationalities were injured (Turkish National Commission of Inquiry 2010). For this incident, Türkiye asked Israel to apologize, but Israel maintained that they did the right thing. Israel's refusal to apologize caused a rift in relations between the two countries which resulted in the freezing of diplomatic relations. This also revived the Turkish-Israeli feud over the oil concession area in the Greek Cypriot Sea. The bad relations that occurred between Türkiye and its allies in the West became increasingly sharp with the approval of a Draft Law by the French Government which stated that there had been structured killings (genocide) against ethnic Armenians during the Ottoman Turks during World War I, which claimed as many as 1.5 million ethnic Armenians who were assigned to Türkiye as a successor of Ottoman rule (Sayare and Marsu 2012). Therefore, through this article, the author tries to examine that there has been a change in Türkiye's foreign policy which was previously highly oriented towards the West.

Theoretical Framework

Türkiye's foreign perspective transforms due to changes in its attitude towards involvement in regional structures and resistance to alterations in the government system, which can affect alliances. As a result, there arises a query regarding the causative factors behind these shifts in attitude, observed both within Türkiye and among its partner nations. Samuel Huntington stated that there has been a fundamental change in relations between countries after the Cold War. According

to Huntington, these changes are due to differences in viewing and solving problems and how the international system is formed and implemented. The occurrence of these differences in views is due to differences in cultural identity that are influenced by geographical location or region, the influence of civilization, and the sub-culture itself which is rooted in religion (Huntington 2001).

According to Huntington (2001) the strengthening of civilizational identity is caused by several factors, the first is that there are basic differences between these civilizations which include history, language, culture, traditions, and most importantly religion. Second, due to the strengthening of globalization, the development of information technology and the speed in conveying information has led to intensified interactions between civilizations and cultures to create a sense of awareness regarding these differences in identity and strengthen the identity of Commonality. As an example, the outbreak of the Intifada movement in Palestine against Israel's military aggression, even though the US denounced Israel's actions but without real action to prevent it caused many reactions in the world, especially among Muslims who feel that Islamic brotherhood must be strengthened and collectively destroy the power of Zionism and its allies. Third, there are changes in the economy and society that separate local human identities. Perhaps what Huntington means here is that the economy is no longer considered a carrier of welfare for human survival, but instead, human survival comes from economic resilience that comes from the availability of capital, so that in pursuing it humans are no longer humans in the true sense but like robots that are regulated systemically in the pursuit of profit, in this case, human relations become marginalized through competition. Huntington said that the void was filled by religious values which in turn created fundamental movements against the developing capitalist system. Fourth is the growth of awareness about civilization, this is since Western power is already at its peak, which is seen from the Western imposition of democratic thoughts and economic liberalism to the world, this invites a strong urge to oppose and the desire for self-determination. The fifth is that differences in cultural characteristics are unstoppable and it is not easy to find a resolution formula compared to economic and political disputes. The last one is

the development of economic regionalism; Huntington thinks that the success of economic regionalism can only be achieved if it is based on the same civilization and culture. Perhaps what Huntington means is that with similarities in terms of cultural and civilizational principles, there will be no significant differences in the mindset and decision-making patterns at both the state and regional levels so that they are easily successful in achieving goals. Huntington describes the success of the European Union and compares it with Japan's desire to form an economic entity in Asia.

Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu (2003) said that at the end of the Cold War, Europe began to organize itself to define its cultural factors, creating a distinction between Europe and Türkiye in terms of the basic characteristics, values, opinions, attitudes, experiences, and cultural similarities that makeup Europe as a unit. Huntington said that among the civilizations currently experiencing development and being involved in a clash of civilizations is Türkiye. This can be seen from the early days of the Turkish revolution, civilization was the main motivator for the country to achieve the goal of Kemal Ataturk's cultural revolution, which was to become an inseparable part of European civilization. Ataturk saw Western culture as superior, which led the countries within it to play an important role in the international system and also their victory over World War I - where Türkiye had to face the harsh reality as a country that was included in the losing group of the wars – as a thought that in the field of security, there was a combination of cultural and knowledge developments. Ataturk's Cultural Revolution which was carried out systematically and consciously saw that the development of Turkish civilization under Ottoman rule could not make Türkiye taken for granted by the West, especially after the conquest period. However, the development of Turkish civilization tends to accommodate more Middle Eastern culture which is synonymous with Islamic values as a national identity. Huntington further stated that the most basic self-awareness is religion, as the basis for identifying identity, so through Kohl, Europe calls the European Union organization a Christian project which does not include Türkiye (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003).

This is what causes the strengthening of Türkiye's identity as an independent entity, not necessarily on initiatives that occur within the country. The West sees Türkiye as nothing more than a form of civilizational and cultural development that is different from theirs. The Western identity tends to be strengthening, especially in terms of geography, Türkiye is considered to be a region directly adjacent to the conflict area, and accepting it into the European internal community will lead to the inclusion of these problems, therefore the West wants a buffer zone for the stability of the European security environment. Europe's rejection of Türkiye's membership increased Türkiye's awareness as an independent country in determining its destiny as a nation in the international community. The awareness of Türkiye's identity as a nation relates to existing history on the heritage of the Ottoman Empire which is the Islamic values and its civilization as a cultural heritage. However, this refusal did not dampen Türkiye's intention to become a member of the European Union but with a different spirit, as stated by the Deputy Prime Minister of Türkiye in 1998, Bulent Ecevit, "*There are countries in the world, such as USA, Japan, and China whose economies are highly developed even though they are not members of any economic union... membership is important to us but not necessary*" (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003).

Interactions between countries that occur in international relations are also influenced by a form of relationship of influence or mutual influence which is reflected in a form of foreign policy that is communicated in the form of diplomacy. The purpose of this attitude is to achieve the main goals of the state against other countries. However, in achieving this goal an instrument is needed in the form of power (Holsti 2001). Many instruments of power can be owned by a country such as owned natural resources which have implications for mastery of economic resources, owned economic power such as consumption power and export-import needs of the country, military strength, geostrategic position, political power that is reflected in the "force power" in the diplomacy carried out. Holsti (2001) states that this instrument can be utilized to the maximum extent possible for the achievement of state goals, but the most important thing is how to mobilize these resources so that their use is following the objectives of achieving them, because according to him, if the state is wrong in directing its influence

(level of technical expertise) from the source of power it has, what happens is the reversal of this influence on unexpected achievements (Holsti 2001).

Foreign policy is a policy that is produced through a decision-making process based on internal (domestic/national) and external (foreign) environmental influences or the international system (Evans and Newnham 1998). Rosenau argues that foreign policy is the implementation of an adaptation made by the state in response to changes in the surrounding environment and as a manifestation of the realization of internal aspirations (Rosenau 1981). Domestic influence is colored by, among others, the demands of domestic interest groups, including political parties, non-governmental organizations, public demands themselves, economic level, internal security conditions, geostrategic factors, and demographics. While external influences are influenced by bilateral and multilateral relations, the development of the international system which includes the existing international regime, the development or establishment of a multilateral international organization, and others. In this case, the category of changes in a country's foreign policy can be seen from changes in individual or personnel, political and socio-economic components (Rosenau 1981). In this case, foreign policy is made and aimed at as a state response to its internal and external environment, both in the form of support and pressure in the form of economics and politics and is aimed at the receiving country (recipient) as well as at the same time as a state action to achieve its national goals (national interest).

K.J. Holsti divides the goals of a country's foreign policy, namely values, timeframe, and types of demands (Perwita and Yani 2005). While Cohen and Haris define foreign policy as quoted by Charles F. Hermann (1978):

“....the general nature of foreign policy-it is a set of goals, directives, or intentions, formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation-state, to affect the target in the manner desired by the policy makers-...”

Cohen and Haris try to define foreign policy as a formula that is carried out by someone who is in a legal policy-making position or in terms of having a position in government, where the policy is directed to many actors or to a condition outside the limits of state sovereignty aimed at influencing patterns what policymakers want. Hermann tries to explain that policies made by the state are not value-free. Not value-free means that foreign policymaking is influenced by the situation and conditions that exist in the decision maker himself or the attitude of the decision maker. Hermann defines this concept as the discrete purposeful action that results from the political-level decision of an individual or group of individuals (Hermann 1978). The author tries to translate that human nature (human behavior), such as emotions, has a considerable influence on the decision-making process. This is supported by Simon as cited by Hermann that there are two conceptions of objective analysis of decision-making (Hermann 1978):

“The first conception explains man's behavior as a response to his environment...the first searches for causal processes and determinants of behavior, and often uses a mechanistic explanation. The second explains as pursuit of a goal...the second conception sees man's action as goal-oriented and focuses attention less on present environmental conditions than on future desired states. Man is conceived less as a product of his environment than as a source of preferences which leads to action...”

Hermann distinguishes the attitude or behavior of decision-making into two, the first is Actional Independence (Autonomous Action) which is a focus on the form of behavior shown by the decision maker and the second is Relational Action, which is a form shown by the recipient of the action or activity implemented by decision-makers (Hermann 1978). The division of these two attitudes aims to determine how the relationship between the actor and the recipient is towards the attitude taken.

The development of Türkiye's involvement in the region is certainly related to the existence of a strong political policy. Türkiye's policy to join the European Union is influenced by the shadow of the glory dreamed of by the founder of the republic, Kemal Ataturk. As stated by Holsti and Hermann that in relations between countries, there is a pattern of influence and mutual influence, while this pattern is a reflection of foreign policy which is made not only based on the usual structure in a policy-making process involving government components, but also involving government components. political leaders as individuals who can directly influence how a policy is taken and implemented.

As an integral entity in international relations, Türkiye plays its role and function in the international political system. Through Kemalist ideology, Türkiye introduced itself as a country with a new, more moderate, and secular identity, apart from the attachments of the Ottoman regime. This was done by Türkiye as a long-term investment, namely trying to make European countries accept it as an integral part of the region. However, to get to this point a fundamental change is needed in the government and social life of Türkiye through the cultural revolution that took place in Türkiye. The main goal of the cultural revolution embodied in the values of Kemalism is to make Türkiye part of the civilized countries identified as Western (European) countries so that through Türkiye's foreign policy, this country directs policies towards the widest possible cooperation. extent with European countries.

What happened in Türkiye certainly received a response both nationally and internationally. At the national level, the changes made by Kemal Ataturk received criticism and opposition from the Turkish people who mostly had influence or had influence during the Ottoman dynasty, especially regarding the dissolution of the caliphate system, the separation between religion and government which had an impact on the abolition of madrasa schools. Meanwhile, at the international level, the changes that have taken place in Türkiye have received varied but positive responses. The basis of these Kemalism values became the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy after Kemal Ataturk's departure. The Republican Party (RPP) and the Democratic Party of Türkiye (DP),

translating Westernization in Kemalism is a close collaboration with the Western world in all kinds of ways and under any circumstances and becomes a domestic political philosophy and in foreign policy (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Relations of Türkiye and The West

Kemal Atatürk's success in building the New Türkiye brought Türkiye's multilateral relations closer to the Western world in advance. As previously explained, there has been a lot of cooperation between Türkiye and other countries, especially with the US and Europe. In its development, the relationship between Türkiye and the two powers did not necessarily run smoothly. The relationship between them rose and fell along with the development of issues that occurred, especially related to regional (regional). For the West, Türkiye's presence has meaning, namely as an ally that benefits the West geostrategically (political and economic). Even so, the view that Türkiye is the successor of an 'empire' that has disappeared cannot be eliminated and seems a bit cynical. This is because Türkiye's change from an empire under the Ottoman Empire to a new Turkish state with all the changes that have been made does not make the world community automatically accept Türkiye as it is. The world community still considers Türkiye to be part of its history which will never be lost from memory.

Emre Öktem in his writings stated that in international law, the birth and death of a state do not necessarily eliminate the rights and obligations of the state in the future, which are referred to in two categories, namely Successor and Continuity (Öktem 2011). According to him, a successor is a new form of continuing the life of a country where there is a change in the system of government and sovereign territory and there is a transfer of power from the predecessor to be continued by the successor. While Continuity is a continuation of government as a result of the breakdown of a unitary state into several new entities and one of these entities inherits the rights and obligations of the previous state. Emre Öktem gave examples of several countries carrying out succession and continuity, including the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state, the formation of New Germany, the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, and Türkiye.

According to Emre (2011), the Turkish state is a continuation of the Ottoman Empire, this is based on the arbitration decision of the Ottoman Empire's debt which states that:

“a state’s obligations do not cease to exist after a revolutionary change of the form of the State or its constitution. All these changes have no influence from the point of view of international law. The State remains internationally the same. There can hardly be rules of international law which are more certain”.

Apart from that, Emre Öktem's assessment of Türkiye's continuity with the Ottomans was based on several areas during the Ottoman rule after the founding of the Turkish state were in territories controlled by Türkiye, the use of the Ottoman flag symbol was also used by Türkiye, and as a continuity country, Türkiye inherited and utilizing all the legacy of the Ottomans for their interests, such as Ottoman representatives abroad, were still used by Türkiye as their representatives by only replacing the individuals on duty, all the weapons owned by the Ottomans were used by the Turkish military.

The ups and downs of relations between the US and Türkiye can be seen, among others, by Türkiye's acceptance in 1952 into an alliance of NATO, and various economic aids flowing into Türkiye. Of course, Türkiye's acceptance into this organization has certain objectives, among others by looking at the geography of Türkiye which has a direct border with the Soviet Union (during the Cold War) and has the potential to threaten it, namely by placing 15 Jupiter nuclear missiles aimed at the territory of the Soviet Union (Gordon and Taspınar 2008). During the Bush administration (2001-2008) and Barack Obama, Türkiye's geographical advantages were still used for the interests of the Unit's national security. According to Robey and Vordermark in an article entitled “Security assistance mission in the republic of Türkiye” in *The Disam Journal* 2003-2004, stated that Türkiye's strategic position in an unstable triangle namely the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East makes its position important for the US in establishing a strong alliance (Sadik 2009). For the US, this relationship does not only have geostrategic goals but also has the aim of spreading the democratization values

adopted by the US (Sadik 2009). This is quite reasonable considering the conditions in the region, especially in the Middle East, the US has very strong concerns over Iran's increasingly strong political developments, as well as Iraq's behavior (during the time of Saddam Husein), another thing is the threat to Israel in the region. originating from terrorist groups identified by the US as well as from countries in the Middle East region. In this case, Türkiye, which also has diplomatic relations with Israel, can be used to help ward off this threat.

Relations between the US and Türkiye encountered obstacles when the two allied countries had different views on the planned invasion of Iraq that would be carried out by the US in 2001. The US, which intended to use a Turkish military base adjacent to the northern Iraqi border, apparently did not get approval from the Turkish parliament, of course, it disappointed the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the US, Paul Wolfowitz, who had hoped for close cooperation. In this case, the US will provide financial assistance to Türkiye in the amount of US\$6 billion which can increase up to US\$24 billion-plus the US will provide access to around 20,000 Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq to secure Türkiye's national interests (Gordon and Taspinar 2008). The rejection by the Turkish Parliament was related to the strong opposition of the Turkish people to the war waged by the US. The decision to reject the US' request was due to the pressure exerted on members of parliament, both from voters and individuals (Sadik 2009). Turkish-US relations have become increasingly strained by the arrest of eleven Turkish commandos who were carrying out a mission in Northern Iraq by US troops, who were treated like criminal prisoners.

The bad relationship between Türkiye and the US is also related to the fluctuating US support for Türkiye's efforts to fight the Turkish Kurdish Party (PKK) which is branded a terrorist group. In addition, it is also related to the invitation to Khaled Meshaal in 2006 to visit Türkiye for the success of Hamas in the general election in Palestine, the invitation itself is a form of appreciation from the Turkish government for the realization of democratic life and the start of a new era of governance in Palestine. However, this invitation was considered strange, especially by the US public, especially for the Jewish community and the

Jewish Committee Organization in the US, who saw it as a form of Turkish recognition of the Hamas government which was considered a terrorist group (Gordon and Taspinar 2008). Another thing that exacerbated relations between the two countries was the raising of the genocide case against the Armenian people that occurred during the Ottoman rule, by the US House of Representatives in charge of foreign affairs on 10 October 2007 (Gordon and Taspinar 2008).

Relations between Türkiye and Europe are not as smooth as their founder, Kemal Ataturk, might have imagined. Even though in the eyes of the US, Türkiye's position is important, not in the other way is felt by European countries members of the European Union. Even though in 1963 Türkiye was quite accepted after the military intervention in the Turkish democratic government in 1971 and 1980 European views changed (Gordon and Taspinar 2008). Direct rejection of Türkiye's membership in the European Union occurred several times, namely in 1997 at the Luxembourg Meeting where the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as a forum that oversees all Christian democratic political parties in Western Europe opposed Türkiye's membership by stating that the country was not part of the culture of the west. The refusal was also conveyed in 2004 at the Helsinki meeting which discussed the accession of ten new EU members and in 2006 when Cyprus which is a member of the European Union rejected Türkiye's membership as a result of the unresolved Turkish Cypriot issue and in 2007 French President, Sarkozy, tried to amend French law regarding the need for a referendum on expanding EU membership addressed to Türkiye.

The Dynamics of Türkiye Foreign Policy

Evan and Newham (1998), Rosenau (1981), and Holsti (2001) argue that a country's foreign policy is a process of domestic situations or encouragement of adaptation to its external environment, both (domestic and foreign environments) create situations of mutual influence which are shown in the pattern of policy making by each actor who interacts with each other. The opinions put forward are reflected in Türkiye's foreign policy which was developed from a policy-making process that developed dynamically with opinions after the foundations of the state were confirmed by Kemal Ataturk. At the beginning of his reign, Kemal

Ataturk formed a party, namely the Republican People's Party (RPP) which served as an instrument to spread the reforms he was carrying out (Mango 2008). This party was the only party authorized by Ataturk's government and played a sizable political monopoly role. Through this party, Kemal Ataturk outlined an article that would eventually become the basis of the state, namely Republic, Nationalism, Democracy, Statehood, Secularism, and Revolutionism (Ahmad 2008). During World War II, Türkiye's political life seemed dim because all attention was devoted to the development of the war situation, another thing that affected was the reduced influence of the RPP at the government level after the elected President, İsmet İnönü, at the 5th party congress in May 1939 announced to separate the party from government bodies. Türkiye, which at that time had an agreement with Germany, decided to terminate the agreement and side with the allies. However, after the war, there were requests to liberalize regulations regarding the re-establishment of political parties based on democratic principles. As soon as the policy of establishing parties was agreed upon, Türkiye started a multi-party life with the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) under the leadership of Celal Bayar. The presence of a new party, or in this case translated by İsmet İnönü as an opposition party, creates dynamism in Turkish political life, namely that previously only concerned with the votes of pro-government parties, parties that want freedom, especially recognition of individual freedom and market.

External factors that pushed Türkiye to enter the multiparty era were pressure from Western countries, especially the US, as the West wanted Türkiye to immediately adopt democratic values in its government. Then the process was implemented after İnönü served as President of Türkiye (Ahmad 2003). The implementation of democratization was realized in the 1950 election which was won by the Democratic Party (Zurcher 2003). The victory of the liberal Democratic Party defeated the Republican People's Party which adopted a conservative republican ideology, creating opposition in every policy taken by the government. Immediately after his victory, the Democratic Party carried out liberalization of the Turkish economy, and under the control of the Turkish Democratic Party it was accepted to join NATO (United States Department of

State n.d.). The application of liberalism in the Turkish government by the Democratic Party did not occur at the level of reality, in 1953 this party issued a ban on professors from universities to participate in politics. The government then exercised strong control over the press and universities. The strong feud between the Republican People's Party as the opposition to the ruling party and the government, made the Turkish military dissatisfied with the occurred situation, on 27 May 1960 the first military coup was launched against the authorities (Dzakarın 2012) (British Broadcasting Corporation n.d.). During the coup, the military dissolved the government, arrested Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two other ministers, and sentenced him to death by a military court on charges of corruption, treason, and violation of the constitution (Dzakarın 2012).

Immediately after the coup, a referendum was held to form a new constitution in 1961 which produced 61.7 percent of the votes of the Turkish people who approved the formation of a new parliament (Zurcher 2003). The new government introduced a new constitution that was considered more liberal than before, namely guaranteeing the protection of democracy, freedom of speech, and guaranteeing human rights (Donmez 2011). The new constitution introduced a bicameral parliamentary system with a National Council consisting of representatives of the people for four years term and members of the Senate for a six-year term of election, however, the members of the Senate are members of the National Unity Committee (KPN) consisting of armed forces officers (Ahmad 2008) (Zurcher 2003). Although the 1961 constitution was considered more liberal, it did not mean that the constitution fully supported the development of civil society. What happened was the integration of the military into Türkiye's political and socio-economic life, including the appointment of a retired general to the position of ambassador or director of a state-owned company. Burak 2011) (Ahmad 2003).

The Turkish military carried out a second coup in 1980 at the urging of secular nationalists, this was due to fears that Türkiye would turn into an Islamic state after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 led by Ayatollah Khomeini (Kinzer 2008). The coup was born as a result of fears that Türkiye would change

direction to what happened to Iran due to the emergence of the figure of Necmetin Erbakan who served as Deputy Prime Minister and was quite popular as a politician. Erbakan, who has a fairly strong religious background, is fully supported by the National Salvation Party (NSP). This party has strong popularity, but its members are considered to be approaching the radical Islamic ideology that was stimulated by the Iranian Islamic Revolution wanting Türkiye to become an Islamic state, this is shown by acts of violence and destruction of shops selling alcohol and hotels selling alcohol. often occupied by foreign tourists (Kinzer 2008). Several things can be analyzed regarding the Turkish Military Coup in 1980 (Laciner n.d.), namely

1. The coup was waged based on Kemalist thinking.
2. The interpretation of Kemalist thought is democracy and not autocracy implemented by Ismet Inonu.
3. The coup perpetrators were more pro-American and pro-Western than Bulen Ecevit.
4. The view of the coup perpetrators who saw that Türkiye's future depended on a capitalist economic system rather than a socialist system.

Necmetin Erbakan eventually rose as Prime Minister in 1995 supported by Tansu Ciller, but his position as Prime Minister of Türkiye did not last long, this was due to the emergence of a coup that was carried out again by the Turkish military in 1997 known as the "post-modern coup d'état". Erbakan's position was replaced by Mesut Yilmaz upon the appointment of President Demirel in 1998 and then replaced by Bulent Ecevit in the 1999 elections. In the development of domestic politics in Türkiye, there have been quite significant changes, namely the strengthening of a religious-based party, namely the AKP (Justice and Development Party). The presence of this party, although contrary to the basic principles of Kemalism, which separates the roles of religion and government, was greeted with joy, and in the end was able to win the elections that were held. The strong support of the Turkish people in the election for the AKP also made the Turkish military willing to compromise and cooperate in government.

Türkiye's struggle to gain recognition as part of the West did not go as smoothly as Kemal Ataturk had hoped. Although the US accepts that Türkiye is part of a strategic alliance for NATO, Europe views Türkiye's presence in Europe differently. Türkiye's geography has a strategic position that can be used for the US strategic interests in the Middle East region and Asia, while for Europe, Türkiye's presence, can endanger internal security stability by accepting the risk of group conflicts that occur in the Middle East, besides by addressing membership of Türkiye in the Union could lead to divisions within the European Union related to the unresolved conflict between Türkiye and Greece regarding Cyprus and several issues that are considered crucial by Europe such as human rights violations committed by Türkiye in Karabakh. Even though the European Union later gave special status to the trade it carried out with Türkiye.

As part of the international community, Türkiye's future does not depend on the acceptance of the European Union and the strategic policies of the US. Türkiye's geographical position, cultural heritage, and political influence during the Ottoman era have made Türkiye's position important in the region (Warning and Kardas 2011). The role of domestic political developments gives deep meaning and influence in the implementation of foreign policy and policies carried out by Türkiye. The large population of the Muslim community has become a political force that should be considered in government practices and is something that is considered reasonable if the foundation in carrying out its politics is based on Islamic understanding as well. AKP (Justice and Development Party) is a political party based on Islamic understanding and won a large number of votes in several elections held, most recently in August 2014 when Recep Tayyip Erdogan was re-elected as President and delivered Ahmet Davutoglu as Minister of Foreign Affairs (Idiz 2014).

Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye introduced the concept of "strategic depth" foreign policy. The purpose of this foreign policy is to position Türkiye as the main "player" in the region, especially for countries that are in direct "touch" with Türkiye and of course, based on the spirit of the legacy of the history of the Ottoman empire (Murinson 2006). With the policy, Türkiye

plays its role by connecting East and West as well as Asia, by forming the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) as an official institution in forming foreign policy orientation and regional policies (Çaman and Akyurt 2011). The goal of TIKA is to ensure coordination between Türkiye and the surrounding countries in the fields of economy, education, justice, art, history, language, ethnography, technology, security, environment, and communication. The countries in question are the countries of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus (Çaman and Akyurt 2011). Through this institution, Türkiye carries out a form of "door-opening and right-advocating" diplomacy for the countries that are included in the cooperation and by acting as a mediator so that their voices (Central Asian countries) are heard by the European Union, OECD, IMF, and NATO.

To maintain its position in Central Asia Türkiye decided to join CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures). The formation of CICA itself was driven by Kazakhstan which aims to be a dialogue forum between countries to strengthen cooperation, peace, security, and stability in Asia (Çaman and Akyurt 2011). Kazakhstan acted as chairman of CICA from 2001-2010 and then handed over to Türkiye as chairman for the period 2010-2012. Türkiye does not waste the opportunity of its interest in carrying out its role in Central Asia. Under Türkiye, CICA has carried out a lot of cooperation in the economic field to humanitarian issues along with other international organizations. The many agendas for cooperation in CICA during Türkiye's leadership were due to sensitive issues that Türkiye felt needed to be neutralized, such as the problems of Cyprus and Karabakh. Through the implementation of foreign policy through the doctrine of "Strategic Depth" formulated by Ahmet Davutoglu, Türkiye has also implemented a policy of "zero problems with neighbors" (Çaman and Akyurt 2011). Türkiye's position in the implementation of this policy is not to oppose big powers which in the end can damage the order that Türkiye wants to build, even if cooperation is possible. Based on this, Türkiye does not seem to want to disturb Russia and sees that the country has an important role in maintaining regional stability. Even though its status as a member of NATO does not prevent Türkiye from establishing cooperation with Russia in the

Central Asian region, especially in terms of energy, this for Türkiye is no different from establishing cooperation with the US and Europe.

In the implementation of foreign policy, there is the role of the ruling government, in this case, the decision-making actor is an important factor in directing foreign policy. In this case, the actor's role is related to the political organization that influences him, the AKP as an influential party in the government has contributed to determining the policy direction taken. Through the foundation of Islamic thought, the AKP through the Turkish government feels that the cooperation that arises is not only limited to Western and non-Western countries formed by different civilizations. The need to establish and maintain relations with countries and groups that have the same civilizational side as Türkiye, namely Islamic civilization, has brought Türkiye to a different nuance from the ideals that Kemal Ataturk hopes to realize. This policy ultimately has different implications in the approach taken by the Turkish government in responding to international problems, of course also towards its allies. For Türkiye, having similarities in terms of past heritage related to the development of the civilization it brings, namely Islamic Civilization, will bring convenience to Türkiye in developing its foreign policy without having to change its identity. Therefore, Türkiye sees that the direction of Western political policies, especially the US, referred to as a form of confrontation which is categorized based on differences in the development of civilization (culture) such as West vs Islam, or West vs non-West, is a mistake (Murinson 2006). This ultimately brought Türkiye to a serious level of problems in Türkiye's relations with its ally, the US in the Second Gulf War.

With its legacy and cultural heritage, Türkiye is starting to play its role as a global actor (Idiz 2014), starting with the efforts to establish cooperation with Russia's 25 million Muslim community. Furthermore, the direction of Türkiye's foreign policy has penetrated Muslim countries which are considered to have important geopolitical values. This policy is based on Türkiye's view of 16 strategic geopolitical positions in the world where eight of them are controlled by countries with a majority Muslim population or those based on Islam. The eight

positions include the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb (the exit of the Red Sea), the Strait of Hormuz (the exit from the Persian Gulf), the Malacca Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Sunda Strait (Indonesia), the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Strait (the exit of the Black) (Murinson 2006). As what Davutoglu stated, Türkiye cannot forever wait for the European Union to open for Türkiye, and it is time for Türkiye to develop a multi-dimensional foreign policy by taking advantage of its geostrategic position.

In its development, Türkiye began to view the importance of the conflict resolution process that occurred in the Middle East, including peace talks between Syria-Israel and the Israel-Palestine conflict, and even direct approaches were made to Iraq and Iran (Warning and Kardas 2011). The approach towards Iraq and Iran was carried out about Türkiye's interests in dealing with the development of Kurdish uprisings in Türkiye who wanted the establishment of a Kurdish state. The context of the change of power in Iraq with the overthrow of Saddam Husein by the U.S. invasion has raised concerns about the surging spirit of the Kurdish struggle under the PKK, especially regarding the US' promise to the Kurdish people in Iraq. Iran, during the leadership of Prime Minister Erdogan, before his inauguration as President of Türkiye, signed a multi-dimensional cooperation related to security cooperation and economic agreements. Once again multi-dimensional cooperation in the security sector is related to Türkiye's great attention to the development of the PKK, in this case, Türkiye expects Iran's commitment not to support Kurdish uprisings in Türkiye and to help Türkiye deal with PKK activities that endanger Turkish security (Warning and Kardas 2011). Türkiye's relations with Syria had deteriorated because of the protection provided by Syria for Abdullah Ocalan, a PKK official, only after Bashar Al-Assaad assisted Türkiye in arresting and deporting him to Türkiye, relations between the two countries improved (Warning and Kardas 2011). While Türkiye's relationship with Israel turned 180 degrees after the shooting incident on the Mavi Marmara ship, several Turkish citizens who joined the solidarity action against Palestine were shot by Israeli special forces. On this occasion, Israel stated that it was not responsible and declared innocent for the actions taken by Israeli troops on board the Mavi Marmara.

Türkiye's geo-strategy has been used by its allies to place its military bases as the support for NATO to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Syrian countryside. However, Türkiye is reluctant to facilitate NATO's military efforts against ISIL as President Assad's position has the same understanding as President Erdogan's. The refusal to fully support the US efforts to eliminate the power of ISIL is due to US support for the existence of the Kurds, which has been an internal problem in Türkiye. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave Iraqi Kurds an advantage over northern Iraq. The US support for the Syrian Kurds became an initiative for Türkiye's awareness to seek closer relations with Iran and Russia as a counterweight to influence in the Middle East region. To prevent the development of the 'advantage' owned by the Kurds, Türkiye chose to establish cooperation with Iran, Syria, and Russia, which on this occasion the four agreed to make Syria free from elements of terrorism and rebel groups that have the potential to make Syria an unstable region (Misrawi 2018). Turkish and Iranian-related military cooperation intensified with the visit of an Iranian delegation led by chief of military staff Mohammad Hossein Bagheri to Türkiye and meeting with President Erdogan, as well as Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli (Asia News 2017). Although Türkiye and Iran have different interests in Syria, Iran convince Türkiye to open alternative efforts with the Syrian regime, which previously Türkiye sided with the opposition. US policy and the political ambitions of the Syrian Kurds are a concern for Türkiye and Iran. This is because the Syrian Kurdish bloc emerged, led by The Democratic Union Party (PYD/Democratic Union Party) as a major player in Syria (Dalay 2017). According to Türkiye, the PYD has an affiliation with the PKK and is a national threat if it gains international recognition and legitimacy, and military skills from the partnership between the PYD and the US.

The increasing support of the US for the Kurds has given rise to Türkiye's desire to enter a new coalition formation in the Middle East with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Qatar (Salafy News n.d.). With the loss of support from the US and Saudi Arabia, it is understood that impossible to face the threat without allying with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Türkiye's role in the Middle East coalition received support from President Vladimir Putin to join the coalition to discuss the next

steps (Osborn and Coskun 2016). The interests of President Erdogan and Bashar Al-Assad changed with the crisis in Qatar, which allowed for an approach between the two to address this threat. Of course, the steps taken by Türkiye made the US under the administration of President Donald Trump anxious and delayed the withdrawal of its troops in Syria, and through Saudi Arabia, the US government wanted a form of regional balance. Seeing the pattern carried out by Türkiye, Stanley Weiss (2017) conveyed his critical view of Türkiye, in his opinion, NATO together with the US should no longer support Türkiye as a member of the Defense Pact organization and start looking for other actors who are more competent in supporting regional security interests that are more comprehensively, according to him the Kurds deserve full support. However, in the formal mechanism, NATO does not have a basis for eliminating membership that has a "bad reputation", so NATO is not easy to sanction Türkiye (Weiss 2017).

Relations between Türkiye and the US suffered a setback following a failed military coup in 2016. The failed coup attempt was seen by President Erdogan as a form of Western support for bringing down his regime. While the West considers the opposite thought by assuming that there is a form of a dictatorial system under the leadership of the AKP party. Furthermore, the Turkish government carried out 70,000 arrests consisting of university professors, military and police officials, a group of judges, and other officials (Muhaimin 2017). President Erdoğan said that the resulting tensions forced the country to find ways for the sake of its security. Tensions have escalated with the purchase of Russia's S-400 missile defense system for Türkiye's military defense. The alleged involvement of German military officers in the failed coup against President Erdogan in 2016 resulted in the emergence of diplomatic tensions between Türkiye and Germany, in June 2017 Türkiye refused to grant the German parliament permission to visit German military personnel stationed in Incirlik. As a result of this refusal, Germany decided to withdraw troops that were part of NATO in the fight against ISIS (Wijaya 2017).

The failed coup act changed the Turkish government system to a presidential one to overcome the security challenges. The full power of the government is held by the president as it is the same with the government systems of France and the US (BBC News Indonesia 2017). President Erdoğan emphasized to supporters that the formation of a new constitution can bring Türkiye the confidence and stability needed to grow and develop in a better direction. The campaign was also carried out by visiting countries where there are Turkish people in them who experienced obstacles and challenges from its allies. One of them is the refusal by the Netherlands to permit Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu to visit the Turkish Consulate in the Netherlands, this refusal was a result of Erdogan's statement stating that the Netherlands is a fascist country and is a relic of the Nazis and Europe needs to get rid of arrogance against Türkiye (Dearden and Agerholm 2017).

Türkiye's attitude (both shown by State Officials and Society) which is quite tough towards Germany, the Netherlands, and NATO shows a strong increasing awareness of identity. Self-awareness (Sense of Awareness) accompanied by the attitude of the same feeling (commonality) is shown by Türkiye as a unitary instrument of power (Hermann 1978). Domestic political dynamism is an internal factor (Lentner 1974) that strengthens the formation of Türkiye's foreign policy, in this case, the efforts made by political parties that give color to domestic politics through policymaking that continuously strengthens and also challenges the basic foundations of the state. which is heavily guarded by the military. However, this dynamic provides domestic reinforcement through the formation of strong emotions with interest groups and individual leadership as conveyed by Hermann through the concept of human behavior.

CONCLUSION

Türkiye's long road to gaining status among European countries is still deadlocked. Even though the continuously hardworking Türkiye leadership for a permanent membership in the European Union, has not gained a “soft attitude” towards Türkiye and was accompanied by suspicions thought of bringing more conflict and Turkification to Europe. Strong opinion for Türkiye's acceptance as

part of the European Union is not enough only on the changes in the political field and intense cooperation with Europe but also must be based on the civilization that forms it. The direction of the foreign policy of "strategic depth" brings Türkiye's deep involvement in cooperation both with regional and international organizations as well as in cooperation between bilateral and multilateral countries. However, in the implementation of its foreign policy, Türkiye tends to approach countries with a Muslim majority due to the sameness of cultural background, and mainly with countries that are directly adjacent to Türkiye in the Middle East region. This brought a new dynamic in international relations, when the West saw political developments in the Middle East and Central Asia through the stick and carrot function, Türkiye act differently, instead through an understanding of the civilizations that built interactions in the region that can help find solutions and cooperation needed. Therefore, Türkiye tries to place its position as the main actor in the political and economic arena in the Middle East and Central Asia.

In the development of carrying out a foreign policy through a "strategic depth" approach, the focus of its policy is also directed toward Russia and Iran, which both are considered to have the same concern interests in the region. With Russia, Türkiye is sharpening its defense sector from an economic and military perspective which has a new influence on resolving the Syrian conflict. The existence of the coalition can divert Türkiye from the west which supports Kurdish rebels as a threat to the Turkish domestic interest. The Turkish government referendum gave Erdogan full rights as President and with the support of the people the new constitution under his presidency will bring stability that Türkiye needs in developing for the better. In the end, changes in Türkiye's foreign policy were shown through the compromise of policymakers towards the situation that occurred in the internal environment through the tug of war between political power and the reaction shown by the external environment by Türkiye's allies.

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