



POLICY ANALYSIS OF GERMANY'S DEPLOYMENT OF LEOPARD 2 MAIN BATTLE TANKS (MBT) TO UKRAINE

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Abstract: *This research analyzes why Germany agreed to send arms aid Main Battle Tank (MBT) Leopard 2 to Ukraine. The decision to send Leopard 2 MBTs to Ukraine, which took months, has given a new color to the turning point in Germany's foreign policy orientation in the field of military security. The reason is that Germany has long adopted an attitude that tends towards pacifism and tightens its use of the military in other countries. Unlike the motive for the Leopard 2 assistance that Germany provided to Ukraine, several previous studies have shown that so far Germany's motive for transferring military equipment abroad has been based on selling or giving it to countries that are not in conflict with other countries. This research uses an explanatory-qualitative method with a case study approach and uses techniques of library research in data collection. Using William D. Coplin's theory of decision-making, this research produces findings that the reason Germany decided to agree to send Leopard 2 to Ukraine was because decision-makers in Germany had been influenced by two main international contexts which then provided stimulation to German domestic political conditions and military economic conditions as a further consideration before finally deciding on the form of agreement to send the Leopard 2 MBT to Ukraine.*

Keywords: *Decision-Making Process (DMP), Germany, Weapons Assistance, Leopard 2 MBT, Russia - Ukraine Conflict*

Abstrak: *Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis alasan dibalik mengapa Jerman menyetujui pengiriman bantuan persenjataan Main Battle Tank (MBT) Leopard 2 ke Ukraina. Keputusan pengiriman MBT Leopard 2 ke Ukraina yang memakan waktu berbulan – bulan telah memberikan pewarnaan baru terhadap titik balik orientasi kebijakan luar negeri Jerman dalam bidang keamanan militer. Pasalnya, telah sejak lama Jerman menerapkan sikap yang condong terhadap pasifisme dan pengetatan terhadap penggunaan militer di negara lain. Tidak seperti motif bantuan Leopard 2 yang diberikan Jerman kepada*

Ukraina, beberapa penelitian terdahulu telah menunjukkan bahwa selama ini motif Jerman dalam mentransfer perlengkapan militer ke luar negeri didasari pada penjualan atau pemberian kepada negara yang tidak berkonflik dengan negara lain. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode eksplanatif – kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus dan menggunakan teknik library research dalam pengumpulan datanya. Dengan menggunakan teori pengambilan keputusan William D. Coplin, penelitian ini menghasilkan temuan bahwa alasan Jerman memutuskan untuk menyetujui pengiriman Leopard 2 ke Ukraina adalah karena pengambil keputusan di Jerman telah dipengaruhi oleh dua konteks internasional utama yang kemudian memberikan rangsangan terhadap kondisi politik domestik dan kondisi ekonomi militer Jerman sebagai konsiderasi lanjutan sebelum akhirnya memunculkan keputusan berupa persetujuan untuk mengirimkan MBT Leopard 2 ke Ukraina.

Kata Kunci: *Proses Pengambilan Kebijakan, Jerman, Bantuan Senjata, MBT Leopard 2, Konflik Rusia-Ukraina*

INTRODUCTION

Since the launch of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, numerous responses have emerged from various actors (Osborn, et.al., 2022). Some parties have condemned, criticized, supported (Hardiantoro, 2022), or imposed sanctions on Russia for its actions (Toh, et.al., 2022). Additionally, several countries have responded by assisting Ukraine. This aid has taken multiple forms, including humanitarian aid, financial support, and military assistance in the form of weaponry (Trebesch, 2023).

In the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine is in a relatively weaker position in terms of military strength and armament compared to Russia. According to the annual assessment by Global Fire Power (GFP) (Global Fire Power, 2023), Russia ranked second out of 145 countries in terms of military strength for 2023. Based on a comparison by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2020, Russia allocated \$61.7 billion to its military expenditures, accounting for 10.8% of its total national budget. In contrast, Ukraine spent \$59.2 billion, representing 7.8% of its total expenditures (Sipri, 2020).

According to data from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2022, the ratio of active military personnel between Russia and Ukraine stood at 21.8%, with Russia having 900,000 personnel compared to Ukraine's 196,000. In terms of reserve forces, Russia had 2,000,000 personnel, while Ukraine had 900,000, a ratio of 45%. Regarding land-based armament, Russia possessed 15,857 armored combat vehicles, while Ukraine had 3,309. In air assets, Russia owned 1,391 fighter jets compared to Ukraine's 132. Additionally, Russia had 948 helicopters, whereas Ukraine had only 55. In naval power, Russia had 49 submarines, while Ukraine had none. (Dewan, 2022)

Many countries have provided military aid to Ukraine, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Poland, Germany, and other EU member states. Since the beginning of the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized the need for military aid in the form of heavy weaponry, particularly tanks, artillery (howitzers of 152mm and 155mm Caliber), and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Between January 24, 2022, and January 15, 2023, the United States, the European Union, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom were the top five contributors of heavy weaponry to Ukraine. However, in early 2023, a new wave of commitments from Western countries emerged, particularly regarding the supply of Leopard 2 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs).

The Leopard 2, a main battle tank developed by the German defense company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), has been used by several European nations, including Poland, Greece, Spain, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as by Canada and Turkey (Liboreiro, 2023). Historically, the Leopard 2 was developed following the failure of a joint U.S.-West German project to design a main battle tank. As a result, the United States developed the M1 Abrams, while Germany proceeded with the Leopard 2 (Gelbart, 1996). Over time, the Leopard 2 has been produced in several variants, including the Leopard 2 A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, and A7+. (KMW, 2023)

During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine placed significant hope on acquiring the Leopard 2 from Germany due to its limited stock of tanks, most of

which were Soviet-era or post-Soviet models (Beaumont, 2023). Additionally, the widespread availability of Leopard 2 tanks across multiple European nations made them a viable option. The Leopard 2 has been regarded as an essential asset for the German military (Bundeswehr, 2021) due to its advanced technology and has become the most popular MBT in NATO's inventory. The popularity of German tanks in military circles is not surprising. Even during World War II, German armored vehicle technology, particularly the Panzer series, influenced tank development in both the Soviet Union and Allied forces. After the war, many European countries studied German tank designs to develop their versions. (Mizokami, 2023)

Ukraine's request for Leopard 2 tanks was not immediately approved by Germany. (Dwiputra et, al., 2021) Historically, German foreign policy has been skeptical about military interventions, particularly regarding arms shipments to conflict zones or factions accused of human rights violations (Driedger, 2021). Between December 2021 and February 2022, the German government signaled its opposition to sending weapons to Ukraine, despite pressure from Ukraine and NATO allies. However, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, by February 15, 2023, Germany had become one of the top five military aid donors of heavy weaponry to Ukraine. On January 25, 2023, after months of deliberation, Germany finally approved the delivery of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. (DW.com, 2023)

This research seeks to explore this topic further, given that Germany, since the post-World War II period until at least the end of the Cold War, has positioned itself as a nation that prioritizes political solutions over military power (Eberle, 2018). This foreign policy identity, which places diplomacy above military action, was also evident in Germany's response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In the context of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine invasion, Germany initially maintained a similar stance, considering the risks associated with military escalation, particularly regarding Ukraine's request for Leopard 2 tanks. Nevertheless, Germany eventually emerged as one of the top contributors of military aid to Ukraine and ultimately approved the transfer of Leopard 2 MBTs.

To establish the novelty of this study and differentiate it from previous research, the author conducted a literature review of studies related to this topic and its approach. First, Valery Ilhamna Putri's journal article, *Analysis of Germany's Interest in Sending Leopard Main Battle Tanks to Indonesia (2012–2017)*, analyzed Germany's rationale for exporting Leopard MBTs to Indonesia during that period using an explanatory-qualitative method and Keith Krause's concept of power and influence in arms transfers. Second, Fachri Tri Utama's undergraduate thesis, *Enhancing Indonesia's Military Capability in Southeast Asia through the Purchase of Leopard Main Battle Tanks (2012)*, employed a descriptive-qualitative approach with concepts of foreign policy, national interest, and balance of power to examine Indonesia's rationale for acquiring Leopard MBTs from Germany in 2012.

Third, Ferdian Fikri Firdausi's journal article, *Germany's Military Assistance to Kurdish Peshmerga in the Fight Against ISIS in Iraq (2014)*, used an explanatory-qualitative method and Holsti's national role concept to explain Germany's reasoning for supplying arms and training Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Fourth, Albadii Fadhil Mila Ayu's journal article, *Policy Boomerang: The Role of National Identity and Norms in Germany's Arms Export Policy to Saudi Arabia in the Yemen War (2015–2019)*, applied a constructivist approach with Wendt's identity and norm concepts to examine the role of national identity and norms in shaping Germany's foreign policy.

Fifth, Zetira Kenang Kania's undergraduate thesis, *Germany's Foreign Policy Shift Towards Russia in the Ukraine Crisis*, used an explanatory-qualitative approach with the foreign policy change framework, balance of threat, and foreign policy response to analyze Germany's decision to impose economic sanctions on Russia during the Crimea referendum crisis under Angela Merkel's administration. Sixth, Huiyi Tian's journal article, *The Foreign Policy Transition of the German Scholz Government in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict and Its Causes*, employed an explanatory-qualitative method and Jakob Gustavsson's foreign policy transition model to analyze why Germany's foreign policy underwent a historic transformation amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Unlike previous studies, this research focuses on analyzing the factors that influenced Germany's decision to provide Leopard 2 MBTs to Ukraine. To address this research question, the study adopts William D. Coplin's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approach, introduced in his 1974 book, *Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview*. Coplin argues that foreign policy decisions are shaped by three factors: international context, domestic political conditions, and economic-military capabilities. The interaction of these factors ultimately determines a country's foreign policy actions. In this study, these interactions are demonstrated by the influence of international pressures on Germany's domestic politics and economic-military considerations. The following diagram illustrates how these factors interact in shaping foreign policy decisions according to Coplin.




Figure 1. 1 How four determinants influence foreign policy action

In Coplin's decision-making theory, the international context can be understood as the product or outcome of a country's past, present, and future political actions. To examine how the international context influences a country's foreign policy decisions, three key aspects must be considered: geographical, economic, and political factors. This means that the geographical location of a country, along with its political and economic relationships with other states in the region, contributes to shaping an international environment. (Coplin, 2003)

The relationship between domestic political conditions and foreign policy formulation is marked by the presence of policy influencers who impact a country's foreign policy decisions. Coplin categorizes policy influencers into four types: mass influencers, partisan influencers, bureaucratic influencers, and interest influencers. However, not all four categories are necessarily relevant for decision-makers. Therefore, in analyzing Germany's decision to approve the delivery of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, the study will identify the most dominant and determinant policy influencers that demonstrably impact the decision-making dynamics.

Economic and military conditions also play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy, in addition to domestic political conditions. Decision-makers must assess their country's economic and military capabilities when formulating foreign policy.

METHODS

The research employs an explanatory approach, aiming to elucidate and determine causal relationships behind a phenomenon based on specific theories, paradigms, or concepts. Explanatory research seeks to answer the question of "why," in this case, why Germany approved the delivery of Main Battle Tank (MBT) Leopard 2 to Ukraine.

This study is also categorized as a case study. Ragin defines a case study as a research strategy based on an in-depth empirical investigation of one or a few phenomena to explore configurations of analyzed cases or to explain the characteristics of a broader class of similar phenomena by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations. (Ragin, 2000) Bennett further asserts that case studies serve as a strategy for theory development, hypothesis formulation, and explaining particular phenomena using causal mechanisms. (Bennet, 2004)

Vennesson classifies case studies into four types: (1) descriptive case study (configurative-ideographic), which systematically describes a phenomenon without explicit theoretical intentions; (2) interpretive case study (disciplined configurative), which employs theoretical frameworks to explain a case; (3)

hypothesis-generating and refining case study (heuristic), which inductively generates new hypotheses and/or refines existing ones; and (4) theory-evaluating case study, which assesses whether an existing theory explains the processes and outcomes of a given case. (Vennesson, 2008)

This research adopts the interpretive case study approach (disciplined configurative), utilizing Coplin's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Theory to explain Germany's decision to approve the delivery of MBT Leopard 2 to Ukraine.

Two types of variables are used in this study: independent and dependent variables. The independent variables, or explanatory units, consist of three factors—international context, domestic political conditions, and Germany's economic-military conditions—that influence or explain the dependent variable, which is Germany's foreign policy decision.

The study analyzes Germany's decision to approve the delivery of Leopard 2 to Ukraine, positioning the international context as the explanatory unit and Germany's foreign policy decision as the analytical unit. Given that the explanatory unit operates at the international system level while the analytical unit is at the nation-state level, the study adopts an inductivist analytical model, wherein the explanatory unit exists at a higher level than the analytical unit.

A qualitative research methodology is employed, with the study being deductive in nature. In qualitative research, the researcher analyzes factors such as opinions or motivations behind specific behaviors. Data collected is classified and correlated to form conclusions. The research is deductive because it begins with a formulated research problem, which is then addressed using concepts or theories to develop a hypothesis. The hypothesis is subsequently tested through data collection and analysis to determine its validity. (Mas'oed, 1990)

The study utilizes library research for data collection, accessing sources such as electronic journals, working papers, books, news reports, and official websites relevant to the research topic. Electronic journal searches are conducted via Google Scholar and Publish or Perish 8, using keywords related to the research topic.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Influence of the International Context on Decision-Making

In Germany's decision to approve the delivery of MBT Leopard 2 to Ukraine, only geographical and political aspects were deemed relevant as key influences or stimuli. The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 is positioned as the geographical aspect of the international context, while pressure from Ukraine and the Western-European alliance, along with the complexity of NATO's relations with Russia and Ukraine, constitutes the political aspect.

The international context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict influenced decision-making, as reflected in German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's "Zeitenwende" speech on February 27, 2022. His speech implicitly indicated that Germany considered the geographical implications of the conflict and anticipated a potential escalation of Putin's war. Consequently, Germany provided military aid to Ukraine, including the Leopard 2 tanks, demonstrating that the geographical aspect of the international context significantly influenced German decision-makers.

The second aspect of the international context was pressure from the Western-European alliance. In a Bundestag speech on January 25, 2023, Chancellor Scholz confirmed that the decision to supply Leopard 2 to Ukraine resulted from intensive consultations with Germany's international allies, while ensuring that Germany did not succumb to external pressures. Although European-Western alliance pressure was acknowledged, it was not the primary factor influencing the decision but rather a component intertwined with Germany's domestic political conditions. (Bundesregierung, 2004)

The third aspect was the complexity of NATO's political relations with Russia and Ukraine. In the same Bundestag speech, the German government emphasized its commitment to supporting Ukraine without escalating the conflict into a direct NATO-Russia confrontation. Scholz asserted that providing Leopard 2 tanks would not automatically involve Germany or NATO in the war. Thus, NATO's political considerations influenced German decision-makers, reinforcing

their commitment to support Ukraine while avoiding direct entanglement in the conflict.

Although the international context plays a significant role in shaping a country's foreign policy, Coplin argues that it can only provide a partial explanation. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of Germany's decision to approve the delivery of MBT Leopard 2 to Ukraine requires further examination of Germany's domestic political conditions and economic-military factors.

The Influence of Domestic Political Conditions on Decision-Making

In the context of Leopard 2 deliveries, bureaucratic influencers were the most dominant policy influencers. Bureaucratic influencers, comprising executive bodies, institutions, and officials within the German government, played a direct role in decision-making. The initial approval for tank deliveries emerged from a Cabinet meeting on January 25, 2023.

Partisan influencers, such as the CDU/CSU parliamentary faction, attempted to influence the decision through a draft resolution on January 17, 2023, urging the government to supply Leopard 2 tanks. However, this resolution faced opposition in the Bundestag and failed to pass. Meanwhile, mass influencers, such as civil society groups, contributed to public discourse but did not directly impact decision-making. No evidence was found of interest influencers playing a role in the decision.

Among bureaucratic influencers, Germany's Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat) played a crucial role. This council advises on security policies and arms control, and its authority extends to politically sensitive military exports. Due to the confidential nature of its deliberations, details of its meetings remain undisclosed, but its institutional role in arms export decisions underscores its significance as a bureaucratic influencer in the Leopard 2 decision.

The Influence of Germany's Economic-Military Conditions on Decision-Making

Economic Conditions

According to Coplin, one of the primary indicators for assessing a country's economic condition is its capacity to produce goods and services, as reflected in its Gross National Income (GNI) and GNI per capita. Data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) indicate that Germany's GNI has increased over the past three years, from €3,756.8 billion in 2021 to €4,027.6 billion in 2022 and €4,286.2 billion in 2023. With a GNI per capita of \$54,030, Germany ranks 21st globally, classifying it as a high-income country. (The World Bank, 2023)

Beyond production volume, economic capacity is also assessed based on the types of goods and services produced. During the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Germany's economic relations with Russia were dominated by issues surrounding Nord Stream gas. Destatis reports that in 2021, crude oil and natural gas constituted 59% of Germany's total imports from Russia. However, following Russia's recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk on February 22, 2022, Germany halted the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project and ceased importing Russian gas by September 2022 (Bundesnetzagentur, 2022). In response, Germany diversified its energy sources, increasing coal and gas reserves, constructing LNG terminals, and securing alternative gas supplies from Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and southern European countries.

Another key economic indicator is a country's dependence on international trade and finance, as reflected in its balance of payments trends.

Table 1. Germany's Balance of Payments in 2022

(in € billion)

Details	Total Debit & Credit	Remarks
1. Current Account		
Goods		
- Receipts	1,550.8	Surplus (+111.9)

Details	Total Debit & Credit	Remarks
- Expenditure	1,438.9	
Services (e.g., transportation, travel, government services)		Deficit (-30.8)
- Receipts	(Not listed)	
- Expenditure	(Not listed)	
Primary Income (e.g., worker compensation, direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investments)		Surplus (+150.0)
- Receipts	(Not listed)	
- Expenditure	(Not listed)	
Secondary Income (e.g., government transfers received and paid abroad, EU contributions, non-government cross-border payments, remittances, cash aid, and other foreign payments)		Deficit (-68.8)
- Receipts	(Not listed)	
- Expenditure	(Not listed)	
Total	+ €162.3 billion	

Source: Report Deutsche Bundesbank Jerman (Maret 2023) | *Dissemination*

Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB) IMF

Based on the table above, in terms of transactions involving goods, services, primary income, and secondary income, Germany recorded a surplus of €162.3 billion in 2022. Additionally, regarding non-financial and capital assets, Germany experienced a deficit of €18.6 billion. However, in terms of net acquisition of financial assets and liabilities, Germany achieved a surplus of €219.8 billion. According to Coplin's classification, Germany is fundamentally a country that does not face significant difficulties in maintaining its balance of payments, as indicated by the surplus in its current account. Moreover, despite being the second-largest donor of foreign aid globally, following the United States, Germany has successfully maintained a surplus in its current account balance.

Economic conditions constitute a key factor considered by the German government. This can be observed in the opening remarks of the Federal


Government Survey agenda speech in the Bundestag on January 25, 2023, during which the government sought to confirm its decision to supply Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. The speech dismissed concerns about potential economic consequences of cutting gas supplies from Russia, asserting that Germany could still maintain strong economic performance. Furthermore, the fact that economic issues were addressed at the very beginning of the speech when confirming the Leopard 2 decision in the Bundestag underscores the role of Germany's economic situation as an essential consideration in the decision-making process regarding the tank deliveries to Ukraine.

Military Conditions

When assessing a country's military condition, Coplin identifies three key aspects:

1. **Military Capability:** In 2022, Germany ranked as the third-largest European country in terms of active military personnel, with a total of 183,150 troops, following France (203,250 personnel) and Turkey (355,200 personnel). In addition to its active forces, Germany also maintained a reserve force of 32,650 personnel. In terms of training levels, official sources indicate that the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) have well-structured and adequately equipped training centers, covering not only national but also multinational levels. Furthermore, Germany possesses a diverse range of military equipment, spanning from space-related technologies to specialized equipment for each command unit. Notably, Germany hosts a robust defense industry capable of designing and manufacturing military equipment that meets established standards (such as NATO standards) across various military domains, particularly in land and naval systems. (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2022)
2. **Dependence on Foreign Military Resources:** Germany exhibits a relatively low level of dependence on foreign military sources, as demonstrated by the following data:

Diagram 1. Global Share of Major Arms Exports by the Top 10 Exporters, 2018–2022



Source: SIPRI *Arms Transfers Database*, March 2023

Based on the diagram above, it can be observed that the United States is the largest contributor to global arms exports, accounting for 40%, followed by Russia (16%), France (11%), China (5.2%), Germany (4.2%), Italy (3.8%), the United Kingdom (3.2%), Spain (2.6%), South Korea (2.4%), and Israel (2.3%). The positioning of Germany among the top five global arms exporters suggests that Germany does not have significant military dependency on other countries. Rather, it functions as a producer that transfers weapons to other nations.

The third aspect concerns Germany's military capacity to maintain internal stability, which is reflected through the Bundeswehr's Homeland Defence Command, a department within the Bundeswehr with responsibilities directly related to domestic security issues.

The general overview of Germany's military situation above is also part of the factors considered during the decision-making process. The primary impetus for the decision to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine stems from Ukraine's request

for German-made Leopard 2 MBTs, which arose within the broader context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2022. This highlights the connection between the international context, specifically the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, and Germany's military-economic conditions. Once the request for these weapons was made, Germany's military capacity became a primary consideration for decision-makers, both in general terms and specifically in terms of the readiness of the Leopard 2 MBTs.

In fact, in a speech by German Chancellor Scholz at the Bundestag, when confirming the decision to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, the German government not only announced its approval of the arms shipment but also emphasized its commitment to providing crew training, logistics, ammunition, and system maintenance. This comprehensive approach indicates that Germany had already carefully considered and prepared the military aspects involved in the decision-making process, ensuring that it could indeed provide the Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the three factors discussed above, in terms of the international context, it is evident that only two of the three contexts significantly influenced decision-makers in Germany: the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, geographically close to Germany, which meant that sending military assistance, including Leopard 2 tanks, was an effort to defend Ukraine as a NATO partner and to uphold collective defence within NATO; and the political complexity between NATO, Russia, and Ukraine, which motivated Germany to continue providing military assistance to Ukraine, including Leopard 2 tanks, while maintaining its status as a non-belligerent state within NATO. The third international context, the pressure from Western European alliances, was not considered relevant in influencing the decision. The German government dismissed the notion that decision-makers were swayed by pressures from certain Western European allies.

Furthermore, as Coplin argues, the international context alone offers only a partial explanation for specific decisions, such as the approval of Leopard 2 tank shipments to Ukraine. Therefore, additional factors are needed to provide a complete and comprehensive explanation. These factors complement the international context and include domestic political conditions and Germany's military-economic situation.

The link between the international context and Germany's domestic political conditions is evident in the role of bureaucratic influencers, particularly the Federal Defence Council within the German executive, which plays a decisive role in advising decision-makers on sensitive issues like the dispatch of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. Bureaucratic influencers are considered a relevant additional factor affecting decision-making due to their authority and capacity in this policy-making model.

Regarding the connection between the international context and Germany's economic and military conditions, the economic aspect is influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly Germany's halt on Russian gas supplies. However, Germany's strong economic capacity, evidenced by its high GNP per capita, its ability to reduce dependence on Russian gas, and a surplus in its balance of payments in 2022, provided a strong foundation for decision-making.

Finally, from a military perspective, Germany's commitment to providing military assistance to Ukraine is reinforced by its military capabilities. With one of the largest active military forces in Europe, national and international training centers, and the ability to produce military equipment domestically, Germany has low dependency on foreign military supplies. These factors, combined with its coordination centers for maintaining domestic stability, provided a solid foundation for decision-makers when approving the shipment of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.

Through an analysis using Coplin's Decision-Making Process theory, this contextualization sheds light on Germany's decision-making process in agreeing to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.




Figure 2. Analysis of the decision-making process and its considerations

Overall, the author concludes that Germany's decision to send Leopard 2 MBTs to Ukraine was influenced by two international contexts, which acted as primary stimuli in the decision to supply the Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. These international contexts, in turn, prompted further considerations for decision-makers, including Germany's domestic political conditions and its economic-military situation. Ultimately, these factors culminated in the decisions made by the policymakers.

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